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Abstract
The causes of the Great Recession that began in 2008, and 
the solutions to prevent a recurrence, have been argued 
over endlessly. The government has responded with 
various actions: e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act (2010); stronger 
oversight of the activities of commercial and investment 
banks; and other measures. A significant unaddressed 
financial concern are the procedures for bank lending to 
businesses, which is largely unrestricted as to loan policies, 
required collateral and other safeguards, and the strength 
of loan covenants that protect the bank during the duration 
of the loan. This paper discusses the situation with regard 
to loan covenants and suggests various remedies
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Corporate Lending in 2015
A company currently applying for funding will not know if a 
loan will be offered, what terms and collateral will be required, 
how the loan will be monitored, or how the lender will manage 
a loan in default. A bank in California may offer a loan if the 
borrower agrees to move all of its financial business to that 
bank; a financial institution in New York may reject the 
application; and a non-financial lender (such as a commercial 
finance company) in the Midwest may offer the loan without 
further conditions. In other words, this entire process is a 
“black-box” that can produce a positive or negative outcome 
for all parties, largely subject to the whims of the lenders.
Assume that we are now at the California bank. The loan 
documentation will involve a series of warranties, conditions, 
covenants, pledging of collateral, copies of financial 
statements, and other material documentation. A naïve 
borrower may assume that these requirements are standard, but 
that would be incorrect. Banks design their own requirements, 
and the entire process can be a “take it or leave it” choice for a 
small or medium-sized business, or a negotiation for a large 
company. The customized content in loan agreement covenants 
depends on the bargaining power and characteristics of the 
borrower and the lender in each contract.
Contents of Loan Covenants
Bank lending to corporations traditionally involves covenants 
that require a debtor to meet specific measures of financial and 
operational performance. For example, the borrower must 
achieve earnings above a stated multiple of interest expenses; 
the current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) 
must be maintained in excess of a specified amount; and 
restrictions may be imposed on future borrowing by the 
corporate. These and several other positive and negative 
covenants provide the creditor with some assurance that the 
debtor is retaining its capacity to service its debt.
A decline in debtor performance can force a loan restructuring, 
the seizure of collateral, or other remediation. Covenants act as 
surveillance and control in lending situations, providing an 
opportunity for creditors to work with borrowers before the 
situation leads to a default, a bankruptcy or other dire outcomes. 
However, covenants impose costs: restrictions may be too 
restrictive and may constrain the borrower's flexibility to take 
necessary actions in response to business opportunities or 
threats. Debt contracts vary over time between traditional 
covenants and “covenant-lite” (sometimes referred to as “cov-
lite”) versions that impose minimal restrictions on borrowers. 
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Introduction
Law and regulation that limit individual and organizational 
behavior are at the core of our government.  With regard to 
business activity, there is a bifurcated attitude: liberals 
generally presume that companies are inherently evil, while 
conservatives often hold that restricting economic activity 
reduces productivity and wealth creation. The legislative 
process with regard to business is nearly always reactive as 
it attempts to prevent the recurrence of a recent disaster
Name your favorite villain: the commercial banks, the 
investment banks, the traders, the regulators, Congress, 
federal agencies, and the list goes on. In all of this, the 
actual culprits are seldom identified. In some cases such as 
in the case of the housing/sub-prime mortgage meltdown, it 
is because there are many participants, each one of which 
played a supporting role (Kohn and Sagner, 2014). In other 
cases it is convenient to blame supposed contributors: 
financial engineers using derivatives to enhance financial 
leverage; bankers originating and then securitizing 
mortgages, and packaging the securities for sale to 
investors; regulators who failed to adequately do their jobs. 
Regulation should thoughtfully address the issue of 
behaviors that should be permitted or forbidden, as well as 
the metrics and control appropriate to measure and resolve 
these questions. 
Corporate Lending Post-Great Recession
Despite the nearly 370,000 words in the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010, there is a strange silence on corporate lending, which 
continues to be the purview of various parties. These 
include bank examiners, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), and procedures and rules as established by 
individual banks in the private market. 
Corporate lending failures and inadequate participation in 
oversight by banks and other counterparties played a 
significant role in the situation. Collapses and near-
collapses occurred throughout the U.S. economy. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, 
as much as 17 to 23% of debt write-downs in the period 
2007 – 2010 in the U.S., U.K., and European Union were 
comprised of commercial mortgage and corporate loans. 
The proportion of nonperforming U.S. commercial and 
industrial loans, and leases, increased more than three times 
during this period. 
When loans have gone into default, banks have sometimes 
adopted the strategy of “extend and pretend” rather than 
properly classifying them as non-performing. Bad loans 
extended beyond their maturity date temporarily prevents a 
loss, but this obviously does not assist in the timely 
payment of debt service.
Cov-Lite Loans
The term “covenant lite” as defined by a leading credit rating 
agency refers to loan agreements with incurrence covenants, 
which are those tested when a borrower takes an action that is 
limited by the covenant. Covenant-lite loans represented 57% 
of total bank loan issuance in 2013 and now constitute nearly 
half of the bank loan market.
Covenant-lite deals became increasingly common through the 
first decade of this century. Market observers attributed this to 
an excess supply of credit. The market for covenant-lite loans 
collapsed in the second half of 2007, and a period of tighter 
and more extensive covenants followed until 2009. Covenant-
lite deals then resurfaced, at least for higher-grade borrowers, 
because of an excess supply of bank funds.
According to Standard & Poor’s, “… growing investor demand 
from structured finance vehicles and hedge funds, have 
allowed bank facilities with weakened ‘covenant-lite’ loan 
structures to emerge as the instruments of choice for many 
issuers. As the volume of leveraged loans reaches an all-time 
high, the proportion of covenant-lite facilities has increased 
tremendously....”
Fewer Covenants = Riskier Loans
In a private market setting – albeit with regulatory 
supervision – fewer loan covenants in bank credit 
agreements have become an inevitability. The 
movement of loans off of bank balance sheets 
(techniques are noted below) weaken the motivation 
of an originating bank to monitor borrower 
performance, resulting in less rigorous oversight 
across dispersed creditors.  This situation can only 
result in continued credit “bubbles” and a repeat of 
the cycle of loans to marginal corporate borrowers, 
inadequate credit review, the dispersal of loans to 
investors and other banks, and government rescues.
During the 20 year period from 1995 through August 
2014, the average number of FDIC failed and 
assisted banks was 28.5; in the worse years of the 
Great Recession  – 2008-2011 – the numbers of 
FDIC fails and assists was 148, 154 and 92 
respectively, or some 4½ times typical experience, 
with FDIC losses of $81.67 billion.
What can go/will go wrong? Financial statement 
data can be manipulated by many techniques; see the 
full paper for situations that involved the use of 
earnings, financial leverage and liquidity results as 
reported on public company financial statements. 
Although GAAP is considered as the foundation of 
financial reporting, significant latitude is permitted 
in the calculation of financial statement accounts. 
Conclusions
This paper argues that the most glaring omission from the 
remediation following the Great Recession banking and 
housing collapse has been in corporate lending. Loans to 
businesses constitute a significant portion of a bank’s 
revenue, yet much of this activity is conducted in the 
private market and beyond the close monitoring of the 
regulators.
The safeguards that are now in use are inadequate to 
provide the protection that banks (and their depositors, 
stockholders and the public) require. Covenants are 
satisfactory when the originating bank(s) maintains 
oversight of the loan and keeps “skin in the game”. The 
use of securitizations, loan sales and covenant-light 
agreements, as well as inadequate requirements for 
collateral, do not begin to offer adequate restitution or 
minimal protection should the borrower encounter 
business difficulties. 
The solution is for the regulators – perhaps through an 
amended Dodd-Frank Act – to require that banks include 
in lending agreements a sufficient number of rigorous 
covenants to clearly understand the performance of the 
corporate borrower in the attempt to minimize the 
likelihood of deception. A few financial statement 
accounts in covenants can certainly be manipulated; it is 
considerably more difficult to influence results throughout 
a comprehensive set of covenants based on the status of 
the business, the income statement and the balance sheet. 
Critically important covenants could be mandatory while 
others could be suggested, particularly as some metrics are 
industry specific. Twelve proposed covenants for inclusion 
are included in the paper, which is certainly more than the 
number found in a cov-lite loan agreement. Each 
suggested financial ratio can be compared longitudinally 
(to previous years’ results) and crosssectionally (to 
industry results).
